INTRODUCTION
Law confers protection upon those privileged by its umbrella who are seen as legal subjects, but it can also maintain patterns of difference and perpetuate inequality (Diduck and Wilson (1997) . This article examines the ways in which the law can cast aside those who sit at the margins of social norms, who are not in the conception of the lawmakers -the invisible subjects. It analyses the mechanisms through which law denies and grants individuals legal visibility and examines the processes by which legal subjectivity is acquired in the area of law regulating assisted 1 Senior Birmingham Fellow, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham.
reproductive technologies (ARTs). The article draws on a case study of single men who wish to become fathers using ARTs who remained invisible for years, but who have recently acquired visibility through human rights litigation before English courts. 1 The analysis of the developments in this controversial area of law, which typically focuses on legal subjectivity on women, provides a particularly apposite case study which serves to identify the social and legal factors underlying the processes of (in)visibilisation and subjectivisation.
First, the article sets out a theoretical framework for the analysis of the acquisition of legal subjectivity in the field of assisted reproduction and it addresses the role of rights in this process. It discusses the interrelation between legal personhood, legal subjectivity, and the concept of rights, paying particular attention to the feminist critique of individual rights. The article proposes the concept of (in)visibilisation for a number of reasons. It allows us to observe and examine the slow and contingent emergence of legal subjectivity in law. It illuminates ways, in which aspects of the human rights critique as an inadequate vehicle of social inclusion can be overcome.
In both respects, the concept of (in)visibilisation provides a diction, in which we can analyse legally relevant experiences, which have not yet crossed the threshold into the formal system of law. Finally, at a more general conceptual level, the article examines the notion of the transformative power of law by tracing the process by which persons obtain visibility through human rights litigation. It analyses the recent jurisprudence of the English courts that contributed to the appearance of single men in the legal realm of fertility treatment. It shows how human rights arguments assume an inclusionary function that helps to bring legal subjects from absence into presence, from obscurity to light, creating new forms of legal subjectivity. In this respect it contributes to the debates seeking to revisit the concept of legal subjectivity and legal personhood, the feminist discourse of exclusion, and the discussions about the inclusive power of law.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The role of rights in the process of visibilisation and subjectivisation Legal personhood and legal subjectivity constitute two of the most important and contested concepts in legal theory and jurisprudence (Norrie, 2000) . According to Naffine only legal personhood -defined by Kelsen as the unity of a complex of legal obligations and rights : -4) -provides us with legal standing and visibility in law (2002: 69) . Legal personhood and legal subjectivity are often used interchangeably. However, while legal personhood refers to the presence or absence of subjects in law in general, legal subjectivity focuses on the content of legal personhood, i.e. the rights and obligations attributed to legal persons. While there is only one legal personhood, legal subjectivity may vary in different social spheres, e.g.
we can be subjects of rights in the area of family law and at the same time be denied rights in the realm of assisted reproduction or vice versa. The concept of legal subjectivity enables the examination of the dynamic process, in which subjectivity emerges in law in a specific social context.
The rights discourse is inextricably linked to the concept of legal subjectivity, which is defined by rights and obligations (Fletcher, 2003) . Yet rights discourses have been subject to powerful critiques by feminist and critical studies scholars, including Minow (1987 ), Tushnet (1989 ), Smart (1989 ), Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright (1991 ), Engle (1992 , Kingdom (1999 ), Fredman (1997 , Munro (2001) and Naffine, Rosenberg (1991) , Kennedy (1997 ), or Douzinas (2000 .
Nevertheless, rights and the rights discourse cannot and has not been dismissed entirely. Many feminist scholars critical of individual rights have developed sophisticated arguments concerning the power and potential of the collective rights discourse to effect social change. For example, Nedelsky, critical of the liberal individualistic interpretation of legal personhood and human rights claims that a relational conception of autonomy can help interpret rights in a way that promotes equality (Nedelsky, 1989) . Rights, she argues, identify harms and help claims against the government (Nedelsky, 2011) . Similarly, Minow, who argued that rights fail those who cannot satisfy the criteria of rationality and independence (1990: 146), also highlighted the importance of rights when she wrote:
Framing questions as alleged violations of legal rights which deserve judicial remedies can secure at least enough official attention to make the claim. The courts of course can deny the claim, but in the meantime the judge has to pay attention, and the fact of judicial attention itself can help mobilize concern in other arenas. …
Litigation allows a chance to challenge dominant perspectives by identifying competing perspectives and by demanding justifications for what has been taken for granted as the way things have to be Minow, : .
This power to draw attention to a particular problem, to mobilise different actors around it, and to challenge existing -often hidden -assumptions, emerges as one of the most important function of rights and rights litigation. But rights have a further, closely interconnected function, which has been so pertinently conveyed by
Williams. Describing the effects of the Civil Rights movement in the USA, she noted that the concept of rights is the magic wand of visibility and invisibility, of inclusion and exclusion, of power and no power. The concept of rights, both positive and negative, is the marker of our citizenship, our participatoriness, our relation to
. William s defence of the symbolic power of rights touches upon the crucial connection between rights and legal subjectivity. Finally, it offers the opportunity to critically examine the process of visibilisation in law and through law, which remains an important, often underestimated and understudied, function of rights.
Visibilisation is understood as a process in which subjects absent or excluded from the legal sphere become legally relevant through the recognition of their particular entitlements and obligations. They acquire visibility as subjects of rights, through legal mechanisms. One such mechanism is human rights litigation. In cases where litigation is successful, visibilisation can be equal to the establishment of legal subjectivity. Even in cases where litigation is unsuccessful and does not create new rights, it helps to shed light on subjects in the context of particular legal expectations.
In these cases, visibilisation constitutes a crucial element in the process of subjectivization and legal inclusion, which can occur through traditional means including legislation and regulation. 
Single men in fertility treatment as vulnerable and marginalised subjects
In recent decades, many scholars have highlighted the privileging of heterosexual couples accompanied by persistent ostracisation and stigmatisation of single women and men in the context of family life (Holden, 2002 (Holden, , 2007 Budgeon, 2008 Budgeon, , 2016 Lei et al., 2015; Doucet, 2014; Doucet and Lee, 2013, Risman, 1986 (Holden, 2007:114) . Men who fathered children, but never married were perceived as unworthy, irresponsible and disengaged. In 1975 Barber lamented that an unmarried father only functions in society as an absent object of blame , expected to remove himself from the scene (1975: 20) . It took years before legal expectations concerning unmarried fathers started to change and the law ceased to be concerned solely with financial responsibilities (Barber 1975; Conway 1996; Fink, 2000; Collier 1995 Collier , 2010 Frost, 2016 (Messner, 1997 (Messner, , 1998 Oakley and Mitchell 1997; Marsiglio and Hutchinson, 2002; Featherstone, 2004; Collier and Sheldon, 2006, 2008 Normative ideas of fatherhood have been transformed via a complex refiguring of a nexus of assumptions that historically constituted fathers as a desirable presence within families. More specifically, this has involved a fragmentation of beliefs about the father as heterosexual … , the father as family breadwinner … , and the father as a figure of masculine authority within the household … . The result … is a contemporary ideal of fatherhood in the law, and a legal policy agenda around engaging fathers informed by contrasting, and often contradictory, ideas about men and masculinities, gender, and autonomy. Collier : -450).
The concept of fragmented fatherhood proposed by Collier and Sheldon helps
elucidate the complexities of the current legal status of single men in assisted reproduction in the UK and the underlying reasons for law s ambiguities. Single men transgress many normative assumptions about masculinity and fatherhood. On the one hand, they assume the role of the head of the family financially providing for their children. They fulfil social expectations, according to which, as observed by Hinton and Miller (2013: 245) , becoming a father is a measure of successful and dominant masculinity. On the other hand, single men who become fathers through assisted reproduction are willing to perform carers roles traditionally associated with women. While this in itself may be increasingly acceptable, the fact that these single men actively wish to eliminate a female partner and second parent from the equation might be seen to challenge dominant conceptions about singleness, masculinity, fatherhood, and appropriate parenting.
In the context of assisted reproduction, becoming a father through this financially, logistically, and emotionally demanding pathway indicates single men s economic privilege and social capital. As such, men who successfully become fathers through assisted reproduction may be said to take advantage not only of scientific advances, but also of the androcentric legal system. This is because, as extensively argued by feminist scholars, the male subject has been traditionally positioned at its centre of the legal system (Palmer, 2002: 93) . The very form of the legal subject is male , marked by his assertiveness, self-interest, and essential individualism (Naffine, 2002: 81-82) . In that sense, it might be easier for single men in fertility treatment to benefit from the human rights discourse which has been traditionally male dominated (Burrows, 1986: 80) . At the same time, single men who wish to become fathers and primary carers of their children destabilise the perception of the male legal subject as a self-contained individual …) alone, singular, withdrawn from the world, and immersed in this privately-constituted thoughts. (Naffine, 2002:82) .
The persisting ambiguities and fragmentation of single men and fathers may explain their absence from the legislation that governs assisted reproduction. Indeed, this article demonstrates perhaps controversially, the lack of visibility in this particular legal framework leads to what Mackeznie, Rogers, and Dodds call situational vulnerability , i.e. vulnerability that is context specific and may be short term, intermittent, or enduring : . Situational vulnerability of single men in fertility treatment is underpinned by social, political and, more importantly, legal circumstances. In this respect, the subsequent analysis strongly resonates with, and revolves around, the famous commentary on law, expressed by Lacey 20 years ago:
The draw [of membership of law s community] consists in law s promise of order, of security and of identity for those who are both eligible for and willing to accept membership of its community -those who know where to draw the line. Its hidden face is its power to silence and exclude those who insist on reading between its lines or who live on the wrong side of the tracks, whilst effecting the discursive alchemy of nonetheless including them in the universal reach of legal subjectivity [emphasis added] (Lacey, 1998: 125) .
The next sections demonstrate how the ambivalent attitudes towards single men have been translated into law regulating ARTs leading to their invisibility and exclusion. They illuminate and attempt to reconcile the tensions between the feminist discourse of exclusion and the situational vulnerability of single men in fertility treatment.
THE SILENT ABSENTEES OF THE LAW

General rules of assisted reproduction -the ambiguous space between exclusion and inclusion
A man wishing to become a single father by ART will need the help of a surrogate who agrees to carry his child. In a traditional surrogacy agreement, the woman giving birth becomes pregnant using her own ovum and therefore has a genetic and gestational link to the child. In gestational or in-vitro fertilization (IVF) surrogacy, clinical intervention is required, and a donated ovum from a different woman is used. Consequently, the access of single men to fertility treatment is governed by a matter of sex equality, neither should be single men (Warnock Report, 1984: para. 2.10). However, the Committee came to the conclusion that as a general rule it is better for children to be born into a two-parent family, with both father and mother (para. 2.10). While they recognised that it is impossible to predict with any certainty how lasting such a relationship would be, they reinforced the two-parent heteronormative paradigm (McCandless and Sheldon, 2008) . 
Pushed into obscurity -legal parenthood provisions
Continuous exclusion from parental orders
The HEF Act 2008 confirmed that surrogacy arrangements are legally unenforceable, requiring that the woman giving birth, i.e. the surrogate be treated as the legal The current law surrounding surrogacy and adoption predestines single men to a situation of multiple legal fictions, where a man must adopt his own (genetic) child who, in the eyes of the law, might also be treated as his sibling. Although legal fiction is an important legal device, which helps stabilise the legal system and achieve social goals, the multiplicity of legal fictions can have the opposite effect. By not recognising single men as a separate group of subjects, the statutory framework regulating assisted reproduction perpetuates and reproduces social exclusion. The next section of this article provides evidence of this exclusion and analyses the consequences of their life on the wrong side of the tracks Lacey, : .
SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND THE LIFE ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS
Invisible subjects of fertility treatment -data analysis
One of the consequences of the legal complexities and uncertainties is the absence of single men from the official statistics concerning fertility treatment in the UK. Our research conducted between 2016-2017 confirmed that the HFEA does not hold any data concerning the number of single men seeking or receiving treatment in the UK. 4 Additionally, out of the six clinics, which provided data concerning single persons (male and female) in response to Freedom of Information (FOI) requests sent in 2016, none reported providing services to single men. 5 In order to establish whether single men have access to ART services and surrogacy in the UK, a content analysis of the web sites of 74 fertility clinics was conducted. 6 Clinics offering private and/or public fertility treatment were selected from each region of the UK from a list available on the HFEA website. 7 The analysis assessed what kinds of treatments were offered by each clinic and to whom (i.e. surrogacy to single men When CCG policies were explored using the search term men/man , the analysis revealed that the term was only included in 97 policies (67%) of the total number analysed. Within these policies the term only appeared once in 19 of the documents (10%). Two contained the term only in an academic reference. 13 The maximum number of times the term men/man was used in any policy was times Wales W(SCC . )n contrast, women appeared in every policy document with a minimum of 3 times to a maximum of 37 times. Although the absence of men from these policies is notable, it is also noteworthy that in the majority of these policy documents men are categorised as sperm donors rather than in a paternal or parental role. The term father appears in % of the 144 policy documents
analysed. This is in contrast to the term mother which is used in % of all policy documents. What the policy analysis makes absolutely clear is that whether heterosexual or homosexual, married or unmarried, fertile or infertile, men are the second sex in ARTs. This is unsurprising given that the burden of assisted reproduction falls predominantly on women. However, the reduction of the role of men to sperm donors serves to further marginalize men in terms of both rights and responsibilities in planning and preparing for parenthood.
The policy analysis confirms the findings by other scholars, which revealed that male partners report being viewed as sperm donors, mere onlookers , bystanders , or stoic supporters at best. They feel side-lined , overlooked , and ignored . Culley at al., 2013; Hinton and Miller, 2013) . Our data analysis reveals that like others who failed to comply with the two-parent paradigm (McCandless and Sheldon, 2010: , single men remain unintelligible within the legal norms Naffine, :
and invisible to the law and regulators of ART services.
In the realm of interstitial legality -surrogacy and nationality laws
Despite the legal and policy limitations, anecdotal evidence collected by surrogacy agencies, law firms specializing in family law, and interest groups suggests that there are single men who have become single fathers through surrogacy and who live with their families in the UK (Prosser and Gamble, 2016; Gamble, 2009 ). 14 Some of these families will come into being abroad, as a result of overseas surrogacy arrangements, and some will be created through surrogacy and private co-parenting agreements in the UK. Those single men, who choose to have a child using surrogacy in the UK, unable to apply for parental orders, will face the well-known challenges associated with the UK legal regime governing surrogacy, including the lack of enforceability of surrogacy arrangements, the lack of institutionalized support, the criminalization of commercial surrogacy, and the shortage of surrogates (Brazier et al., 1998; Horsey and Sheldon, 2012; Prosser and Gamble 2016) .
The uncertainties, entrenched in the UK legal and policy framework, have resulted in many single men looking for alternative pathways to parenthood overseas in countries like the USA (e.g. California, Oregon). International surrogacy and the process of bringing the child born abroad to the UK can be very long and complicated (Horsey et al., 2015; Gamble, 2009; Tobin, 2014) . The challenge of relocation stems from the intricacies of the British nationality law and from the fact that parenthood and nationality are separate legal institutions governed by different legal fields. With regard to the child s nationality, it will depend on the relationship status of the surrogate. If the surrogate is in a recognised relationship and is not British, the child may not be eligible for British nationality. In that case, before applying for the child s passport, an application needs to be made for (ome Office registration of the child as a British citizen. If the surrogate is not in a relationship and the single man is the child s biological father, the child will be born British by descent according to s 2 British Nationality Act 1981 and will be entitled to live permanently in the UK. )n order to be issued the child s passport the law again requires the permission of both parents (Foreign Commonwealth Office, 2014).
Furthermore, foreign provisions determining parental rights do not affect the (already fragmented) UK family law. 15 Consequently, even if the legal parenthood of the father is accepted in the country where surrogacy took place and the child s nationality is approved by British authorities, upon return to the UK his parental responsibility for the child will not be recognised. According to s 4(1)(a) Children Act 1989 it is not possible for an unmarried father to acquire parental responsibility by birth registration if the child is born outside the UK. In order to obtain parental responsibilities the single father would have to apply for parental orders, which, as we know, at the moment is legally impossible. As a result, families continue their lives outside the realm of legality, with their parental status acknowledged in one country, but not recognised in another. This was well exemplified in A (Foreign Surrogacy-Parental Responsibility) [2016] EWFC 70, in which Child Arrangements
Order had to be made to remedy this lack of legal recognition and protect the child s welfare.
The legal and structural issues surrounding surrogacy for many single men may drive their decision to enter into a co-parenting agreement through online websites (Sainsbury, 2016) . 16 In such cases two single persons (regardless of their sexual orientation) can become parents of a child using assisted reproduction. The two single people will attend a fertility clinic, not as separate individuals, but as a couple.
The law on assisted reproduction can formally accommodate them, using a legal fiction that the two persons are receiving treatment together. Co-parenting arrangements alleviate many of the problems discussed above. Although these agreements may result in a long-lasting co-parenting relationship, they defeat the purpose of single parenthood. Importantly, such arrangements are not free from challenges. Co-parenting agreements are not legally binding and while they can guide the courts in case of any potential dispute 17 , they do not eliminate the uncertainty entirely. Consequently, some co-parenting families never obtain a formal confirmation of their parental status. These families, lacking formal recognition, occupy a space in a legal vacuum, in-between private and public sphere, in-between legal and non-legal normative orders, and/or in-between jurisdictions. Forgotten and without adequate protection they find themselves in a realm of interstitial legality.
The example of Ian Mucklejohn shows that formal recognition of parental status is not essential for a fulfilling and successful life as a single parent (Mucklejohn, 2006) .
Ian became the first identified single man in the UK to use surrogacy to become a single father. His children were born in the USA in 2001 and he returned to the UK shortly after, without any significant obstacles, albeit with considerable legal assistance. Like many other intended parents (Horsey et al., 2015) , he did not have any disputes with the surrogate mother or the egg donor and remained in contact with both of them Mucklejohn, . )an s decision to engage in foreign surrogacy has been widely publicised, yet the public authorities never challenged his parental status and his three sons were able to grow up with him without any disruption from public authorities. Although Ian Mucklejohn did not perceive himself as being in a disadvantageous position, it is clear that a significant amount of effort and money was required to minimise the potential risk of losing his children. As observed in his book, as far as the authorities were concerned, as long as there were female nannies caring for his three children, he was an irrelevance Mucklejohn : . Ian
Mucklejohn s example suggests that a single man could become a parent through ART and lead a successful and uninterrupted family life, but only as long as he was prepared to lead a conventional life and remain outside the common field of vision.
However, legal recognition becomes crucial in times of crisis. As highlighted by
Collier and Sheldon, parental responsibility has a highly symbolic value, which is increasingly recognised by courts in family disputes outside the context of ART (2008: 192-3) . Furthermore, parental rights are essential where there is a risk of disputes between the parent and the educational, health, or social services. This is particularly true, whenever the parent takes a decision that diverges from the commonly accepted parental behaviour. Medical law provides many examples where doctors contest parental decisions falling outside the acceptable social norm. 18 The state of interstitial legality can bring unsettling uncertainty even for successful, educated, and wealthy persons, who are able to benefit from assisted reproduction and surrogacy. The continuous hidden existence may result in a state where the full enjoyment of rights in the most important aspects of social life becomes impossible.
Single men who become fathers through ARTs could, thus, be considered situationally vulnerable because of the lack of parental rights (Mackenzie, Rogers, Dodds, 2014: 8) . Their vulnerability will depend on the extent to which they decide to conform to social roles and expectations. It may deepen if their parental status is challenged and family life disrupted by public authorities. Even those privileged and empowered, can find themselves sharing the experience of the other , the vulnerable, the excluded. It is not entirely surprising that it was the litigation based on the prohibition of discrimination (in family life) -inextricably linked with the concept of difference and exclusion -that triggered the revealing, inclusionary power of law.
THE REVEALING POWER OF LAW -HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION AS A MECHANISM OF ACQUIRING VISIBILITY
In September 2015 the court adjudicated the first of two cases involving a single father who wished to establish parental responsibility for his biological child (Z) born through fertility treatment to a surrogate unmarried mother in the USA. 19 The The litigation highlights the importance of the applicant s recognition of the unacceptable nature of legal invisibility and the uncertainty it brings. It also demonstrates the transformative potential of the experience of marginalisation and exclusion. In order to initiate the adjudicative procedure the applicant must recognise himself/herself as a subject of rights entitled to legal remedy. Re Z shows that the process of inclusion requires mobilisation, recognition and active participation of the excluded subjects. One could even say that legal mobilisation and visibilisation is impossible without them. The human rights litigation on grounds of discrimination in private and family life can serve as a method to acquire visibility that leads to legal inclusion in the membership of law s community Lacey, :
125).
CONCLUSIONS
This article utilised the concept of (in)visibilisation to critically analyse the emergence of single men as legal subjects in the field of law regulating assisted reproduction. The analysis has shown that for years single men in fertility treatment experienced exclusion from the law, official statistics, policy and any meaningful political discourse. They remained unintelligible within the legal norms (Naffine, 2002: 80) . Forced to look for alternative complex pathways to parenthood, they have lived with their families hidden and unnoticed, occupying a realm of interstitial legality. Consequently, single men using ARTs to become parents can be seen to both, challenge and reinforce feminist views about the law and legal subjectivity, according to which the very form of the legal subject is male in that the legal person is always perceived as unitary, never multiple (Naffine, 2002: 82) . They challenge the existing ART legal framework, in which the legal subject is female, while the man is seen mainly as a means to facilitate reproduction or a supporting parent. Single men in fertility treatment seem to defy many persisting stereotypes when they negotiate multiple identities and navigate between various perceptions of masculinity, fatherhood, and singleness. At the same time, their case confirms feminist views about law s power to silence and exclude those who insist on reading between its lines or who live on the wrong side of the tracks Lacey: : .
While some tensions between feminist discourse of exclusion and the position of single men in fertility treatment discussed in this paper remain, by bringing them to the foreground, the article has opened a new direction of feminist inquiry in a novel area of law.
The article demonstrates the explanatory potential of the concept of Finally, the present analysis demonstrates the clear role of the courts in the path to the acquisition of legal subjectivity and rights by new subjects; a path that in the case of single men in fertility treatment was not achieved through Parliamentary debate alone. The courts in the UK have been the subject of continuous critique by human rights lawyers and feminist scholars for producing judgments preserving traditional and patriarchal family structures. However, the present study suggests a shift in this regard, observed by scholars in other areas of law (King, 2012; Dickson, 2015) . 27 Of course, it would be naïve to draw definitive conclusions concerning a progressive turn in jurisprudence on the basis of this one example alone. The realities are complicated and the jurisprudence meandering. However, the effects of litigation should not be underestimated. By granting single men visibility in Re Z, the courts limited the legislative flexibility of government. It remains to be seen whether the government will keep its promise and secure the status of single men in fertility treatment thus acknowledging their existence as full subjects of ART and family law.
In case of delays it should be recalled that …the practical consequence of nonregulation is the consolidation of the status quo: the de facto support of pre-existing power relations and distributions of goods within the private sphere. (Lacey, 1998: 77) . Bryon-Dodd K. N(S cutbacks worsen )VF 'postcode lottery' in England ,
BioNews, available at: https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_96135.
